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ASSISTED OUTPATIENT TREATMENT:
AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL INVASION OF
PROTECTED RIGHTS OR
A NECESSARY GOVERNMENT SAFEGUARD?
Emily S. Huggins*
I. INTRODUCTION
Kendra Webdale never saw it coming. As she stood along the train tracks among
countless other New York City commuters, she suddenly felt a shove in her back, and
before she knew what happened, she landed face first in the subway tracks before her.
Within seconds she was crushed by an approaching train and died shortly thereafter.
Her attacker was Andrew Goldstein, a lifelong paranoid schizophrenic who had been in
and out of psychiatric treatment. While undergoing regular medical treatment as an
inpatient, Goldstein was under control. Every time he was released, however, Goldstein
would fail to take his medication, and consequently he would decompensate and his
mental illness would re-emerge, characterized by unpredictable and violent behavior.'
Kendra Webdale's death was followed three months later by the dismemberment of
Edgar Rivera, who lost both of his legs after being pushed in front of an oncoming train
by another schizophrenic assailant who had terminated his medication.2
These tragedies touched off a flurry of publicity and community outrage, which led
to the passage of New York's Mental Health Law § 9.60, popularly called "Kendra's
Law." 3 The focus behind New York's new law was to prevent mentally-ill patients from
decompensating to the point of violence. 4 While many states have passed similar legis-
lation providing for the mandatory treatment of mentally-ill citizens who pose a danger
to society, New York's law went further than most. Those who support the law insist
that it is sufficiently narrowly tailored to protect the interests of the mentally ill, but
there are many who fear that Kendra's Law unconstitutionally infringes on the rights of
all citizens to refuse medical treatment and to be free from unwanted physical restraint.
5
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1. See Maggie Haberman et al., Woman, 32, Is Pushed to her Death in Subway Horror, N.Y. POST, Jan.
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Jan. 28, 2000, at 20.
4. See Erin O'Connor, Note, Is Kendra's Law a Keeper? How Kendra's Law Erodes Fundamental
Rights of the Mentally III, 11 J.L. & POL'Y 313, 314 (2002).
5. See Id. See also Watnik, infra note 12; Gutterman, infra note 53; Perlin, infra note 113; Winnick,
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Further criticism is levied at the procedure itself, including allegations that the statute
does not afford sufficient due process protection for the rights of the mentally ill, and in
particular infringes on the rights of those who have not been formally determined to be
incompetent. These arguments will be considered in greater depth below.
This Note is organized as follows: Part II analyzes the text of New York's Kendra's
Law. In Part III, this Note compares the chief provisions of Kendra's Law with outpa-
tient treatment laws enacted in other states. Part IV examines the U.S. Supreme Court's
and lower courts' treatment of the constitutional questions implicated by the statute.
This section also explores recent New York case law interpreting Kendra's Law and
discusses the policy arguments both in favor of and in opposition to the law. Finally,
this Note concludes by suggesting that the New York legislature consider a compromise
position regarding the imposition of psychological treatment on mental patients who
have not been adjudged incompetent. This compromise would include a revision to the
current text of Kendra's Law to incorporate a provision requiring a finding of incompe-
tence, or at minimum a formal diagnosis of mental illness, before an assisted outpatient
treatment order under Kendra's Law could issue.
II. KENDRA'S LAW: A STATUTORY ANALYSIS
Kendra's Law provides in relevant part:
(c) Criteria for assisted outpatient treatment. A patient may be ordered to obtain as-
sisted outpatient treatment if the court finds that:
(1) the patient is eighteen years of age or older; and
(2) the patient is suffering from a mental illness; and
(3) the patient is unlikely to survive safely in the community without supervi-
sion, based on a clinical determination; and
(4) the patient has a history of lack of compliance with treatment for mental
illness that has:
(i) at least twice within the last thirty-six months been a signifi-
cant factor in necessitating hospitalization in a hospital, or receipt of
services in a forensic or other mental health unit of a correctional
facility or a local correctional facility, not including any period dur-
ing which the person was hospitalized or incarcerated immediately
preceding the filing of the petition; or
(ii) resulted in one or more acts of serious violent behavior toward
self or others or threats of, or attempts at, serious physical harm to
self or others within the last forty-eight months, not including any
period in which the person was hospitalized or incarcerated immedi-
ately preceding the filing of the petition.
6
Several of the above provisions of Kendra's Law have since become highly contro-
versial and thus warrant careful consideration. In particular, the requirement that the
patient be "unlikely to survive safely in the community" has been criticized as unduly
restrictive as many other similar statutes use a higher standard to measure survival in the
community than New York's low threshold of "unlikely to survive."7 The New York
6. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(c) (McKinney 1999).
7. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 334-121(Michie 1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.3 (Michie
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standard is important because it may serve to impermissibly restrict the rights of compe-
tent, yet mentally-ill individuals, based purely on the opinion of physicians or psychia-
trists. Additionally, much has been made of the provisions allowing assisted outpatient
treatment (AOT) on the basis of either a "history of a lack of compliance" with medical
treatment or threats of violence, presumably under the belief that these prongs constitute
guesswork and are not necessarily rooted in provable fact.8
Kendra's Law also provides an expansive list of potential petitioners, including:
anyone over eighteen with whom the mentally ill individual resides; the individual's
parent, spouse, sibling, or child eighteen years or older; the director of a hospital in
which the individual resides; and a qualified psychiatrist who is treating the individual,
among others.9 This list arguably provides for petitions by those in a position to respon-
sibly assess the mental health of the individual under consideration and the potential
threat he or she presents, but may simultaneously confer too much authority on the
medical profession. 10
Kendra's Law also provides a right to counsel for the subject of the petition as well
as a hearing, which is to be held within three days of the filing of the petition.' If the
subject of the petition fails to appear for the hearing, it is conducted in his or her ab-
sence. However, critics of the statute point to the short time period for securing counsel
and the provision for a hearing in absentia as indicia of a failure of due process.' 2 Fur-
ther, critics point to the statute's provision for a treatment plan as questionable grounds
upon which to base a coercive course of treatment, which, they claim, amounts to forci-
ble medication.13 The physician who performed the examination to support the initial
petition is also the one to devise the subject's court-ordered treatment plan.' 4 The plan
is to be developed in consultation with the subject of the petition, the subject's treating
physician, and upon the subject's request, an individual significant to him or her.' 5
Again, however, critics argue that this amounts to coerced compliance as AOTs only
issue pursuant to court order, effectively leaving patients no choice but to comply.
16
Under such a coercive scheme, then, the patient's participation in crafting the treatment
plan is no more than a formality and fails to provide any substantive protection for the
mentally-ill individual.
Another aspect of Kendra's Law that has received significant criticism is its reliance
on physician testimony alone as the basis for outpatient commitment. According to the
1976); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-10-110 (Michie 1977).
8. Id. § 9.60(c)(4).
9. Id. § 9.60(e).
10. This is in contrast to other state outpatient commitment statutes that provide either multiple physician
examinations to form the basis for a petition for outpatient treatment or provide the patient with the opportu-
nity to present his own medical evidence. See, e.g., VA CODE. ANN. § 37.1-67.3 (Michie 1976).
11. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(h).
12. See Ilissa L. Watnik, Comment, A Constitutional Analysis of Kendra's Law: New York's Solution for
the Treatment of the Chronically Mentally Ill, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1181, 1186 (2001).
13. See O'Connor, supra note 4, at 343.
14. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(h)-(i). The provision allowing the examining physician and the
testifying physician to be the same individual, as well as the fact that only one physician is required to commit
a mental patient under Kendra's Law is a significant change from New York's prior mental patient commit-
ment laws which required at minimum two examining physicians and one concurring physician for commit-
ment of a mental patient. See Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 965-967 (2d. Cir 1983).
15. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(i)(1).
16. See Fred Fusco, Kendra's Law is "Patriot Act for Mental Patients," POST STANDARD/HERALD
JOURNAL, March 17, 2004.
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statute, the court must hear testimony from the examining physician explaining the
terms of the proposed plan prior to its acceptance by the court. 17 The physician's report
must include the categories of assisted outpatient treatment, the rationale for each cate-
gory, facts that establish that the proposed plan is the least restrictive alternative, and if
the plan includes medication, the report must explain the classes of medication recom-
mended, the beneficial and detrimental physical and mental effects of the medicine, and
whether the medication should be self-administered or administered by a physician.
18
However, physician predictions of violence are unreliable and cannot justify even mini-
mal psychological side effects to a patient who has not chosen to submit to medication
in the first place.
Finally, the statute also provides for appropriate action in the event that the subject
refuses to comply with the treatment plan. If the subject refuses to take his or her pre-
scribed medication, and efforts were made to solicit the subject's compliance, the exam-
ining physician is authorized to request the detention of the subject for a seventy-two
hour period of observation to make a determination regarding whether involuntary in-
patient commitment is warranted.' 9 However, if at any time during the detention there is
a determination that the subject does not meet the involuntary admission and retention
requirements under New York law, the subject must be released.2 °
Significant to the following analysis is the language of the statute, which expressly
states that "[a] determination by a court that a patient is in need of assisted outpatient
treatment under this section shall not be construed as or deemed to be a determination
that such patient is incapacitated." 21 This is particularly significant due to the heightened
protection that is due to all citizens who have not been determined to be incompetent,22 a
concern that figures prominently among the critiques of Kendra's Law.
III. OTHER STATE ASSISTED OUTPATIENT TREATMENT LAWS
A. Arizona's Conditional Outpatient Treatment Law
Arizona's AOT law provides for written treatment plans, issued by the hospital
medical director and staff most familiar with the offending patient.23 The plan must
include requirements such as medication and supervision and may include periodic re-
porting requirements, as well as travel and behavioral restrictions. While the patient is
provided copies of the document, he or she has no right to contribute to the formation of
the plan.25 Further, the medical director administering the plan is authorized to make
17. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.600).
18. Id. § 9.600)(1)-(2)
19. Id. § 9.60(n).
20. See id.
21. Id. § 9.60(o).
22. See Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 437, 494 (N.Y. 1986) (stating that "neither the fact that appellants are
mentally ill nor that they have been involuntarily committed, without more, constitutes a sufficient basis to
conclude that they lack the mental capacity to comprehend the consequences of their decision to refuse medi-
cation that poses a significant risk to their physical well-being").
23. ARIz. REv. STAT. § 36-450.01 (2003).
24. Id. § 36-450.01(B)(4).
25. Id. § 36-450.01(A)(3).
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alterations at any time as he or she sees fit.26 Finally, the plan can be rescinded at any
time and the patient subsequently returned to an inpatient mental health facility.
2 7
While Arizona's AOT law may seem significantly more restrictive than Kendra's
Law at first glance, a key difference makes the Arizona statute far less intrusive. The
statute applies only to patients who are being conditionally released from an inpatient
treatment program, and thus necessarily they have already had a formal incompetence
determination. Kendra's Law, by contrast, gives significant power to medical profes-
sionals to restrict the life activities of individuals who have merely been shown to pre-
sent a potential threat of harm due to mental illness, but have not been determined to be
mentally incompetent. Consequently, Arizona's conditional outpatient statute is actu-
ally less restrictive and more protective of the rights of mentally-ill individuals than the
current AOT statute of New York.
B. New Hampshire's Conditions of Conditional Discharge Statute
Unlike Arizona's AOT statute, New Hampshire's law28 only grants conditional dis-
charge upon informed consent of the mentally-ill individual and pursuant to his or her
agreement to participate in "continuing treatment on an outpatient basis. '29 Pursuant to
the program, the patient agrees to any rules adopted by the commissioner and the treat-
ment plan is to last for the duration of the patient's involuntary admission order.3 ° Thus,
like Arizona's AOT law, New Hampshire's statute only applies to mentally-ill individu-
als who have been committed to inpatient facilities. Commitment to an inpatient facility
necessitates a formal determination of mental incompetence. Therefore, despite New
Hampshire's grant of broad authority to physicians to craft treatment plans without sub-
stantial oversight, New Hampshire's law is actually more protective of patients rights
because it requires an incompetence ruling, while Kendra's Law permits treatment based
on evidence that the patient is suffering from mental illness alone.
C. Alabama's Commitment of Mentally Ill Persons Statute
According to Alabama's statute, an individual can be committed for outpatient
treatment if the probate court finds based on clear and convincing evidence that:
(1) the individual is mentally ill; (2) as a result of the mental illness the respondent
will, if not treated, continue to suffer mental distress and will continue to experience
deterioration of the ability to function independently; and (3) the respondent is unable
to make a rational and informed decision as to whether or not treatment for mental
illness would be desirable.
3 1
Alabama's commitment procedure is somewhat similar to New York's because it
addresses mentally-ill individuals who reside in the community and potentially pose a
26. Id. § 36-450.01(H).
27. See id.
28. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:50 (1986).
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.2 (1991).
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safety threat. However, the key difference between Alabama's statute and Kendra's
Law is found in the third requirement under the Alabama statute, which mandates a pre-
commitment finding of incompetence before a judge. This requirement adds a layer of
protection for the mentally ill in Alabama that is missing under Kendra's Law, namely a
safeguard for individuals who are mentally ill but not incompetent or unable to "make a
rational and informed decision.
' 32
D. Hawaii's Criteria for Involuntary Outpatient Treatment
Hawaii's Involuntary Outpatient Treatment statute33 mirrors Kendra's Law in many
respects. Hawaii requires that the subject of the order be suffering from a severe mental
disorder; that the individual have received inpatient treatment or presented a threat of
imminent danger to self or others in the recent past; that the subject be currently in need
of medical treatment to prevent a relapse or deterioration; and that the person be capable
of surviving safely in the community under the treatment plan.34 However, Hawaii's
law additionally requires that "the person's mental status or the nature of the person's
disorder limits or negates the person's ability to make an informed decision. 35 Much
like the Alabama statute, Hawaii's minimum threshold requirement of a finding of com-
promised mental competence prior to the issuance of AOT orders provides a safeguard
against violations of the rights of the competent but mentally ill-a protection that is
missing from Kendra's Law.
E. California's Assisted Outpatient Treatment Statute
California's AOT statute 36 is strikingly similar to Kendra's Law in several aspects,
but its divergences are far more significant. Among the elements required for an AOT
order to issue in California, the subject of the order must: (1) be eighteen years or older;
(2) be suffering from a mental illness; and (3) have been subject to a clinical determina-
tion that he or she is unlikely to survive safely in the community without supervision.37
Additionally, the patient must have a history of lack of compliance with treatment and a
mental illness that has either (a) resulted in necessary hospitalization or treatment at
least twice within the last thirty-six months or (b) resulted in one or more acts of serious
and violent behavior toward himself or others, or threats or attempts at such acts, within
the last forty-eight months.38 California's AOT statute also requires that the patient have
been offered the opportunity to participate in a voluntary treatment plan and currently
have a condition that is substantially deteriorating.39 Further, the AOT order must be
judicially-determined to be the least restrictive alternative available, the subject must be
in need of the AOT to prevent serious harm, and the court must determine that the sub-
ject will likely benefit from the AOT order before it issues.4 °
32. See id.
33. HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 334-121 (Michie 1984).
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. CAL. WEL & INST. CODE § 5346 (West 2002).
37. Id. at § 5346 (a)(1)-(3).
38. Id. at § 5346 (a)(4).
39. See id. § 5346(a)(1)-(6).
40. Id. § 5346(a)(7)-(9).
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Although California's AOT law contains several provisions that are nearly identical
to Kendra's Law-such as the determination that the subject is "unlikely to survive" in
the community, the required history of lack of compliance, and the demonstrated threat
of harm posed by the subject-California's law provides a safeguard that is lacking in
New York's version. California explicitly requires that the AOT be the least-restrictive
alternative available to aid the subject of an order, while New York's AOT orders can
issue regardless of other options at the disposal of the courts.
F. Virginia's Involuntary Admission and Treatment Law Center
As an initial matter, Virginia's involuntary admission statute4 1 requires that the
judge provide the subject of a petition the opportunity to enter voluntary treatment and
works with the mentally-ill individual to craft a suitable treatment plan.42 However, if
the subject refuses, the court must advise him or her of the right to counsel and to a
hearing, for which counsel may be appointed. Further, unlike Kendra's Law, Virginia's
statute allows the subject to present his or her own expert testimony and evidence of
mental competence. 43 Following a court-ordered examination by a licensed psycholo-
gist or psychiatrist, the examiner must then testify as to whether the subject: (1) is or is
not mentally ill; (2) presents an imminent danger to himself or herself or others; and (3)
requires either involuntary treatment or hospitalization." Further, prior to issuing an
order for inpatient commitment, the judge must request a certification from the commu-
nity board where the subject resides indicating that the subject presents a threat to the
safety of the community or is unable to care for him or herself, that involuntary com-
mitment is the least-restrictive alternative available, and that the recommendations are
made solely for the care of the mentally-ill individual.4 5 Finally, the judge must then
issue findings that the subject (1) presents an imminent danger to him or herself or the
community due to mental illness or is so mentally-ill that he or she cannot care for him
or herself; and (2) that alternatives to involuntary commitment have been explored and
that no less restrictive alternative exists before the judge may enter the order for invol-
untary commitment.
46
Virginia's statute thus has three separate layers of review, all three of which require
an independent finding of mental illness and also require that involuntary commitment
be the least-restrictive alternative available to the mentally-ill individual. Kendra's Law,
by contrast, has no real least-restrictive alternative requirement because it merely re-
quires that during the proceeding, a physician testify to his opinion that the subject of a
petition is "suffering from a mental illness. ' ' 7






47. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(c)(2) (McKinney 1999).
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G. Wyoming's Statute Governing Involuntary Hospitalization Proceedings
48
Among the existing involuntary commitment statutes, Wyoming's statute provides
the greatest discretion to the judge to determine the appropriate course of action for
involuntary treatment of mentally-ill individuals. Wyoming's statute assumes involun-
tary hospitalization as the default treatment for patients who have been examined by a
physician within the fifteen days preceding the court hearing and who have been deter-
mined to be mentally ill. 49 While this seems to confer significant power on the judge,
there is a safeguard inherent in the language of the statute that is not present in Kendra's
Law. Wyoming requires that the subject of a commitment hearing have been deter-
mined to be mentally ill prior to the hearing. 50 This requirement protects those whose
mental status is questionable or undetermined from ever being the subject of a commit-
ment proceeding unless they are adjudged mentally ill. Kendra's Law, by contrast, al-
lows outpatient commitment proceedings against persons who pose a potential threat to
themselves or others or who are "unlikely to survive" in the community, 51 but does not
require an actual finding of mental incompetence.
52
Based on the analysis of other states' AOT statutes, Kendra's Law seems to be
somewhat of an anomaly among AOT statutes due to its failure to require a finding of-
incompetence prior to the issuance of a commitment order. As discussed below, New
York's decision to omit the incompetence requirement has been the source of much
debate regarding the constitutionality of Kendra's Law.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
A. Due Process and Kendra 's Law
1. The Supreme Court's Due Process Analysis of the Right to Refuse Medical Trea-
ment
Much of the recent debate surrounding outpatient treatment laws has focused on the
due process rights of those subject to the orders. 53 To better understand this line of ar-
gument, it is necessary to take a closer look at how the Due Process Clause applies to
the right to refuse medical treatment. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees that the government will not deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law. 54 Although the Supreme Court has never really
clarified the extent of due process protection for the mentally ill, as discussed below, the
Court has confirmed that the mentally ill have a liberty interest in refusing unwanted
psychotropic medication. 55 However, the Court has left the determination of the proper
48. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 25-10-110 (Michie 1977).
49. See id. § 25-10-1 10(a)(i)(A).
50. Id. § 25-10-110(a)(i)(C)
51. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (c)(3) (McKinney 1999).
52. Id.
53. See Jennifer Gutterman, Note, Waging a War On Drugs: Administering a Lethal Dose to Kendra's
Law, 68 FORDH-AM L. REv. 2401, 2418 (2000).
54. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
55. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982).
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balance between individual liberty interests and competing government interests to the
states.56
The bulk of the successful challenges to AOT laws across the country have come
under the Due Process Clause, particularly focusing on the right of all individuals to
refuse unwanted medical treatment. The right to refuse medical treatment was solidified
in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health,57 in which a patient living in a persis-
tent vegetative state was removed from life support pursuant to the substituted judgment
test accepted by the Missouri Supreme Court below.58 In Cruzan, the Supreme Court
accepted the application of the substituted judgment test to cases involving incompetent
patients, requiring proof of the incompetent patient's desires regarding his or her own
medical treatment by clear and convincing evidence prior to imposing treatment.
59
While in Cruzan the patient's choice concerned a refusal of medication to prolong the
life of a woman living in a persistent vegetative state, the Cruzan substituted judgment
standard should be extended to protect mentally incompetent patients who face involun-
tary outpatient commitment under Kendra's Law.
6
0
The first Supreme Court case to deal with the specific issue of refusal of medication
by a mentally-ill patient was Washington v. Harper, in which a prisoner challenged
mandatory medication.61 In Harper, the Court established that a prisoner has a liberty
interest in avoiding psychotropic drugs, but that his right is tempered by the state's in-
terest in protecting the inmate and others from harm.62 Therefore, the Court adopted a
lowered standard of review, which only requires that the prison's reasons for invading
the prisoner's constitutional rights and for forcibly administering drugs be "reasonably
related" to a legitimate penological objective.63
The Court later extended its holding in Harper to dangerous individuals in pre-trial
detention in Riggins v. Nevada.64 In Riggins, a criminal defendant on trial for murder
was forcibly administered psychotropic drugs without any prior finding that medication
65was the least restrictive alternative or even the medically-appropriate course of action.
The Riggins Court employed a higher level of scrutiny than that used in Harper by re-
quiring a "compelling" showing of the need for the administration of psychotropic drugs
to a dangerous pre-trial detainee.66 Thus, although the Riggins Court clearly articulated
that the right to refuse medical treatment does not rise to the level of a fundamental
right, it did leave the door open for interpretation, according greater protection to those
56. Id.
57. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (upholding the Missouri Supreme
Court's requirement of proof by clear and convincing evidence of the treatment preference of an incompetent
patient under the substituted judgment standard for medical treatment).
58. Id. at 273. The substituted judgment test requires that the party seeking treatment demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that the patient is incompetent and that the court determine whether the pro-
posed treatment is narrowly tailored to give effect to the patient's liberty interest.
59. Id.
60. Note, however, that extension of the Cruzan holding to cases involving mentally-ill patients subject to
medical treatment for which they cannot choose their preferred course, would require that the New York
legislature adopt a provision requiring a formal adjudication of mental incompetence prior to the issuance of
an AOT order.
61. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
62. See id. at 223.
63. Id.
64. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992).




who are not yet formally incarcerated. 67 But, because the Court has yet to directly ad-
dress the issue in the context of mentally-ill individuals living in the community, the
standard of protection and whether the "least restrictive alternative" test must be em-
ployed remain open questions. Further complicating the analysis is the potential for a
situation to arise in which the dangerous individual falls somewhere between detention
in state custody and fully-integrated citizen.68 Again, the Court has yet to address the
protection that would be due a mentally-ill citizen who is deemed likely to commit a
crime or cause harm to himself or another. However, given the earlier cases dealing
with individuals already in state custody, it is likely that the Court would resolve such
cases based on the degree of severity of the threat posed by the mentally-ill individual.
2. The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment in the Lower Courts
While the Supreme Court has yet to weigh in with particular regard to mentally-ill
individuals residing in the community at large, several lower courts have issued deci-
sions addressing the right to refuse medication in this context. 69 In Rogers v. Okin, the
District Court of Massachusetts recognized a police power explanation for the forcible
administration of psychotropic medication in emergency situations.70 In Rogers, the
court determined that forcible medication of involuntarily-committed patients is permis-
sible in "emergency situations in which a failure to do so would result in a substantial
likelihood of physical harm., 71 Emergency situations were defined to include predic-
tions of future violence and psychological deterioration. 72 However, the power to co-
erce medication was expressly limited to emergency situations, preserving the basic
right of mental patients to refuse medication in non-emergency conditions.
73
Also of relevance is a Third Circuit case, Rennie v. Klein, which addressed the right
to refuse medication in a non-emergency context under New Jersey's administrative
regulations. 74 In Rennie, the court held that forcible medication in a non-emergency
context infringes on the protesting patient's liberty interest.75 However, the court also
included a caveat, allowing for forcible medication when the physician judged that the
76medication was necessary to prevent the patient from endangering himself or others.
Subsequent cases have followed Rennie in upholding the patient's protected liberty in-
terest in freedom from unwarranted intrusions on individual liberty. 77 Further, courts
must recognize that the protections afforded mentally-ill patients under the federal con-
stitution are merely minimum requirements; states are free to afford greater liberty pro-
tections to their citizens. In this vein, critics of AOT laws argue that "treatment with
67. See Gutterman, supra note 53, at 2421.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 2422. See also, Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979); Rennie v. Klein, 653
F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc) (recognizing the right of the state to forcibly medicate mentally-ill patients
in cases of emergency when the patient poses a risk of harm to himself or others around him).
70. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979).
71. Id. at 1365.
72. Id. at 1364.
73. Id. at 1361.
74. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc).
75. Id. at 838.
76. See Gutterman, supra note 53, at 2423.
77. See, e.g., Osgood v. District of Columbia, 567 F.Supp. 1026, 1030 (D.D.C. 1983); Project Release v.
Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 974 (2d Cir. 1983); White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 111 (3d Cir. 1990).
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psychotropic drugs not only impacts the patient's bodily integrity, but also the individ-
ual's mind, which is the 'quintessential zone of human privacy.
' ' 78
3. Due Process and the Government's Interest Versus Individual Rights
Generally speaking, individual rights are paramount to competing government in-
terests, even with regard to the privacy and liberty interests of the mentally ill. How-
ever, the Supreme Court has articulated two conditions under which government inter-
ests may supersede those of individuals: (1) in emergency situations;79 and (2) in situa-
tions in which the individual is unable to care for or control him or herself.80 These
conditions thus correspond to the familiar government police and parens patriae pow-
ers.
8 1
Under some states' police power, the government is authorized to abrogate the
rights of mentally-ill individuals when there is an immediate threat of physical vio-
lence. 82 Therefore, in the context of the forcible administration of medication, "danger-
ousness" allows involuntary drugging based on a prediction that the patient will deterio-
rate and thus presents a threat of future violence.8 3 Put another way, an emergency ex-
ists when the mentally-ill individual engages in conduct, or is imminently likely to en-
gage in conduct, that poses a risk of harm to the patient or to others. This standard was
first articulated in Rivers v. Katz84 and has since been expounded by the New York
courts.8 5
In addition to acting pursuant to the police power, the government is also authorized
to act under its parens patriae power, which in this context refers to the state's power to
act on behalf and for the protection of its citizens. The standard delineating the scope of
the parens patriae power in the context of forcible medication was enunciated in Project
Release v. Prevost.86 In Prevost, the court held that a finding of mental illness did not
create a presumption of incompetence. 87 Generally, the individual's right to self deter-
mination outweighs contradictory government aims absent a showing of a compelling
78. See Hondroulis v. Schumacher, 553 So.2d 398, 415 (La. 1989) (articulating concerns that forcible
medication constitutes an impermissible invasion of privacy).
79. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (holding that "[t]he state has a legitimate interest
under its parens patriae powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders
to care for themselves; the state also has authority under its police power to protect the community from the
dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill").
80. Id.
81. See John Kip Cornwell, Understanding the Role of the Police and Parens Patriae Powers in Involun-
tary Civil Commitment Before and After Hendricks, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y. & L. 377 (1998).
82. See Gutterman, supra note 53, at 2427 ("Government officials exercise broad discretion through their
police powers to protect public health, safety, welfare, and moral behavior. In certain situations, the state may
utilize this police power authority to involuntarily restrain mentally ill patients in hospital settings. The state's
police power stems from its legitimate interest in preventing the mentally ill from harming themselves or
others. This principle of 'societal self defense' has been applied ubiquitously to restrain any person who
endangers the safety of others.").
83. See Dennis E. Cichon, The Right to "Just Say No": A History and Analysis of the Right to Refuse
Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA. L.REV. 283, 338 (1992).
84. Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 437, 496 (N.Y. 1986).
85. In re K.L., 2004 WL 303202 (N.Y. Feb. 17, 2004) at *3; In re Urcuyo, 714 N.Y.S. 862, 840 (N.Y.Sup.
Ct. 2000).
86. Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983).
87. See id. at 971.
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government interest. 88 Therefore, diminished mental capacity without a finding of in-
competence does not necessarily undermine an individual's due process rights.
To preserve the liberty rights of the mentally ill, the Supreme Court devised the
substituted judgment standard in Cruzan.89 Under the substituted judgment test, two
conditions must be satisfied. First, the proponent of forcible medication must show that
the patient is conclusively incompetent by clear and convincing evidence. 90 Note that
this requires actual proof of incompetence, as Project Release clearly established that
proof of mental illness does not constitute proof of mental incompetence. 9' Second, the
court must decide whether the proposed treatment is narrowly tailored to promote the
liberty interest at stake, here the right to refuse unwanted medication.92 This standard
requires the judge to weigh the relevant factors adduced at trial to determine whether the
patient will be best served by a course of treatment that requires forcible medication.93
While this test seemingly provides a significant amount of discretion to the judge, it also
provides a safeguard against arbitrary decision-making by requiring a showing of in-
competence by clear and convincing evidence prior to forcible treatment.
94
B. Recent New York Case Law
The body of New York case law interpreting Kendra's Law is sparse at best, largely
due to the recent enactment of the law. However, several challenges to Kendra's Law
were recently decided-all of which upheld the constitutionality of New York's AOT
law.
1. In re K.L.
In February of 2004, the New York Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of
Kendra's Law against several due process challenges in In re K.L.95 This case involved
a petition for outpatient commitment of a mentally-ill individual diagnosed with
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, and a history of psychiatric hospitalization and
noncompliance with prescribed medication and treatment, as well as aggressiveness
toward family members during periods of decompensation. The court first dismissed
respondent's argument that Kendra's Law is unconstitutional because it fails to provide
a judicial incompetence determination. Distinguishing this case from its holding in
Rivers, the court held that Kendra's Law was a valid regulation because it "neither au-
thorizes forcible medical treatment in the first instance nor permits it as a consequence
of noncompliance with court-ordered AOT. 96 The K.L. court then went on to reject
respondent's argument that Kendra's Law violated due process because it provided for
extended detention of a mental patient without notice or hearing. While the court agreed
88. See id. at 977-79.
89. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 273.
90. Id.
91. See Project Release, 722 F.2d at 971.
92. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 273.
93. See Gutterman, supra note 53, at 2431.
94. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 273.
95. In re K.L., 2004 WL 303202 (N.Y. Feb. 17, 2004). In particular, respondent challenged the statute's
failure to require a finding of incompetence, as well as the statute's provision for a seventy-two hour removal
and detention without notice or hearing. The court rejected respondent's arguments on both challenges. See id.
96. Id. at *4.
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that the extended detention of a mental patient under Kendra's Law constitutes a signifi-
cant deprivation of the patient's protected liberty interest, the court found that the state's
interest in protecting its citizens against dangerous non-compliant mental patients out-
weighed the risk of erroneous intrusion into the patient's liberty rights.97 The holding in
In re K.L. is consistent with all prior challenges to the constitutionality of Kendra's
Law, and suggests that the New York courts will continue their pattern of deference to
the New York legislature.
2. In re Martin
In re Martin also presented a challenge to the constitutionality of Kendra's Law,
and in particular to the provision allowing for involuntary commitment of mental pa-
tients without a prior finding of mental incompetence.98 Much like the respondent in In
re K.L., the patient in In re Martin sought to challenge the AOT order obtained by the
director of a psychiatric hospital, ordering respondent's involuntary commitment.99 The
court ultimately rejected the respondent's due process argument, showing great defer-
ence to the law as enacted, holding that because the patient may participate in forming
his own treatment plan, the statute did not deprive the mental patient of his due process
rights. 1° ° The court was further persuaded by the fact that under Kendra's Law, no
treatment can be forced upon a mental patient for failure to comply with his prescribed
treatment plan, which led the court to conclude that the statute is a valid exercise of the
state's emergency powers.
10 1
3. In re Urcuyo
In re Urcuyo involved a constitutional challenge to forcible treatment under
Kendra's Law.10 2 The respondent argued that the court is required to find by clear and
convincing evidence that a respondent lacks the capacity to make a reasoned treatment
decision regarding his or her own treatment plan. 10 3 The respondent further argued that
enforcing a treatment plan without a finding of incapacity violates the individual's right
to make his or her own medical decisions.' ° 4 The petitioners in Urcuyo, however, re-
sponded that the law was not unconstitutional because "there is no forcible administra-
tion of medication [under Kendra's Law] and the patient will suffer no punitive measure
97. Id. at *6-7. The court relied on the three-factor balancing test established in Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), to determine that the state's compelling interest in protecting the community out-
weighed the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the mental patient's rights during detention. The court was
particularly persuaded of this balance in light of safeguards such as the requirement of judicial review as to the
threat posed by the individual, the requirement that extensive medical history be presented, and the necessity
of a physician's testimony that the patient poses a threat to himself or the community prior to the issuance of
an AOT order. Id.
98. Court Decisions, Second Judicial Department, Supreme Court, Queens County, 225 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 9,
2001, at 31 (citing slip opinion in In re Martin).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 31.
102. In re Urcuyo, 714 N.Y.S.2d 862 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000).
103. See id. at 865.
104. See id. at 841-42. See also Project Release, 722 F.2d at 971 (holding that a finding of mental illness
does not establish a presumption of mental incompetence).
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for failing to comply with the treatment plan."'0 5 It was this distinction that the court
found persuasive, holding that Kendra's Law was constitutional because it did not re-
quire the forcible administration of medication. 0 6 The court also rejected the respon-
dent's equal protection challenge reasoning that the "different treatment for assisted
outpatient subjects as opposed to [alleged incapacitated subjects] and involuntarily
committed psychiatric patients is warranted."' 1 7 Consequently, the court determined
that Kendra's Law was not unconstitutional even though it did not include "a require-
ment that a respondent lacks the capacity to make a reasoned treatment decision before
an AOT order can be granted."'
08
4. In re Conticchio
Although not the primary focus of the litigation, Kendra's Law was addressed in
dicta in In re Conticchio' 0 9 in which the court sought to reconcile Kendra's Law with the
New York Court of Appeals decision in Rivers. The tension between the Rivers holding
and Kendra's Law had been mounting, centering on the fact that Kendra's Law did not
require a finding of incompetence prior to issuance of an AOT order. Critics argued that
this provision of Kendra's Law was unconstitutional because in Rivers v. Katz the New
York Court of Appeals determined that the right for a competent individual to determine
the course of his medical treatment was a fundamental right."0 Further, this right was
subject only to police power and parens patriae exceptions, which had to be based on a
compelling state interest or alternatively an immediate threat to the community."' The
court in In re Conticchio attempted to resolve the dissonance between Kendra's Law
and Rivers, stating:
The recently passed legislation known as Kendra's law is based on the dangers that
can arise from schizophrenics and other mentally disturbed persons who cease or re-
fuse to take their necessary medication. While said law is apparently based more on
the State's police power, it reemphasizes the importance of not permitting interrup-
tions in the treatment of such individuals." 1
2
While the court attempted to reconcile the need to protect the community with the
parallel requirement that the state recognize the rights of the mentally ill, the court was
unable to offer to any substantive solution to resolve the competing concerns. The court
thus set a precedent tending to support the state's protective powers over the individual
rights of mental patients that has been narrowly followed in subsequent New York case
law. As evidenced by the recent holding in In re K.L. and the continuity in the jurispru-
dence of New York AOT challenges, it seems unlikely that Kendra's Law will succumb
105. Id. at 868.
106. Id. (holding that "Kendra's Law contemplates treatment of patients who have been discharged from
the hospital. These patients do not require forcible administration of medication").
107. Id. at 849. The court ultimately concluded, "Kendra's Law provides the means by which society does
not have to sit idly by and watch the cycle of decompensation, dangerousness and hospitalization continually
repeat itself." Id.
108. Id.
109. In re Conticchio, 696 N.Y.S.2d 769 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).
110. See Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 496.
11. Id.
112. Id. at 774 (citations omitted).
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to a constitutional challenge in the near future. However, this trend may change as the
sting of the recent slate of tragic deaths in New York dissipates and the state legislature
begins to consider the wide-ranging effect of eliminating the liberty and privacy inter-
ests of the mentally-ill without a formal incompetence determination.
V. POLICY ARGUMENTS
As this Note has repeatedly discussed, Kendra's Law has created significant contro-
versy in New York and throughout the country regarding the constitutionality of the
AOT laws and their ramifications for the mentally-ill individuals within their ambit.
Some of the most common arguments both in support of and against Kendra's Law are
examined below.
A. Opponents of Preventive Outpatient Commitment Laws
1. Constitutional Deficiencies of Kendra's Law
First and foremost, opponents of Kendra's Law are troubled by the provision for
forcible medical treatment without a finding of patient incompetence.1 ] 3 The statute
does not require a formal adjudication of incompetence prior to the administration of
medication, allowing the state to forcibly medicate allegedly under the parens patriae
power without a showing of a compelling state interest.' 4 Further, if the subject of the
treatment plan fails to comply at any point, he or she can be forcibly detained and exam-
ined for mental illness and violent proclivities without the protections of state law re-
quirements for inpatient commitment.1 15 Hospitalization can occur on the basis of phy-
sician recommendation, and in spite of the patient's fundamental liberty interests.
Further, the statutory language only requires a finding that the patient is "unlikely"
to survive in the community, leaving unclear its relevance to a finding of incompe-
tence. 116 Opponents of the statute are left to wonder whether this provision is to serve as
an implicit requirement for an incompetence finding, and to fear that this statute sanc-
tions psychiatric treatment without any determination regarding competency.' 17 There is
a real concern, therefore, that Kendra's Law impermissibly broadens the category of
persons eligible for forcible treatment, and provides a state-sanctioned means to circum-
113. See Gutterman, supra note 53, at 2436. See also Michael Perlin, Preventive Outpatient Commitment
for Persons with Serious Mental Illness: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Outpatient Commitment Law:
Kendra's Law as a Case Study, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y. & L. 183, 193 (2003) (stating that "[o]ne of the
implicit "givens" of the contemporary OPC debates is that persons with mental illness are not competent-in a
lay sense, if not in a legal sense-to decide whether to self-medicate in a community setting").
114. See Gutterman, supra note 53, at 2434 (arguing that Kendra's Law is unduly intrusive because it
infringes on individual liberties without a determination by the state that an emergency exists or a determina-
tion that the individual in question is mentally incompetent).
115. Further, this detention may be preventive in nature, as Kendra's Law only requires that the subject
pose an imminent threat to society before he or she may be taken into preventive detention. This standard is
significantly lower than that required for the state to declare an emergency, which mandates that the subject be
a dangerous person or one who "engages in conduct or is imminently likely to engage in conduct posing a risk
of physical harm." See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 27.8(a)(4) (2003).
116. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(c).
117. See Perlin, supra note 113, at 193-94 (discussing concerns that all outpatient treatment laws implicitly
assume that those who are mentally ill are thereby also mentally incompetent, which he disputes).
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vent the constitutional protection of liberty and self-determination for those whose in-
competence has not been determined but is only suspected."
8
Under New York law, the right to refuse treatment is fundamental, protected under
the right to liberty, freedom of expression, and as a right to privacy. Kendra's Law does
not require proof of either an emergency or a determination of incompetence. 1 9 In New
York, the proof required for a showing of an emergency is imminent danger which ne-
cessitates a significantly higher amount of proof than that contained in the history of
violence provisions under Kendra's Law.' 20 The minimal evidence of a threat of vio-
lence required to invoke the statute is insufficient to amount to a compelling state inter-
est that overcomes individual rights; rather, it is an unconstitutional preventive measure.
Thus Kendra's Law is an impermissible exercise of the state's police power authority
and violates the rights of the mentally ill who are subject to its constrictions without
adequate proof animating its authority.
2. Procedural Failings of Kendra's Law
Opponents of Kendra's Law take issue with the contention that it presents the least-
restrictive means available to reduce the threat to the community posed by potentially
violent mentally-ill citizens.12' As a threshold matter, they argue that because Kendra's
law does not provide clear criteria for assisted outpatient treatment will ultimately lead
to higher inpatient commitment rates. 122 The significant discretion reserved to medical
professionals essentially obscures from public view the process by which patients are
committed. Further, the lack of transparency for commitment review, should the patient
fail to adhere to his or her treatment plan, will lead to arbitrary and increased inpatient
commitment orders. Opponents of Kendra's Law also point to the narrow three day
window between examination and hearing, which severely limits the opportunity for the
subject of a petition to secure counsel and mount a defense to charges of mental illness
and posing a threat of danger to the community. 23 Therefore, Kendra's Law reduces
the safeguards established in Rivers and poses a severe threat to the liberty of any citizen
who shows features of mental illness and for whom evidence of the threat of potential
violence can be shown.
Tied to the arbitrary and secretive nature of the patient review process is the unreli-
ability of psychiatric assessment. 2 4 To date the research on the accuracy of psychiatric
predictions shows significant unreliability, and therefore should not be used as the basis
for assisted outpatient treatment and its resultant restraints on individual rights. The
118. Id. at 196-97 (discussing what Perlin calls "widening the net"). By this, Perlin refers to the broadened
reach of AOT laws, both in terms of their effect on the individual liberties of those subject to them as well as
the burden imposed on the states who must administer the hearings and oversee the resulting treatment plans
of those subject to them.
119. See Gutterman, supra note 53, at 2435.
120. Kulak v. City of New York, 88 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 1996). See also supra note 82 (containing a discus-
sion of the requirements for exercising emergency powers under New York state law).
121. See Gutterman, supra note 53, at 2437-38.
122. See Mind Freedom Online, NY State Set to Pass Law Today Allowing Involuntary Psychiatric Drug-
ing of People Living In Their Own Homes, Out In The Community, at
http://www.mindfreedom.org/mindfreedomnews/99084.shtml. (last visited April 13, 2004).
123. See Perlin, supra note 113, at 196 (arguing that "vigorous advocacy" under the three day window for
the subject to mount a defense is all but impossible, particularly because it deals with the mentally ill who are
not in hospitals, and therefore have fewer resources at their disposal).
124. See Gutterman, supra note 53, at 2438.
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restrictive consequences of Kendra's Law far outweigh its potential beneficial effects,
leading to a statute that is fueled by fear and consequently results in an unconstitutional
intrusion on individual rights without proof of any measurable resulting social benefit.1
25
Others point to the serious dangers posed by psychotropic drugs and the possible
consequences of their side effects. 126 While the statute does provide for elucidation of
the primary risks and benefits of medication, it relies on the medical profession to pro-
vide unbiased information to the court and then further relies on a non-medical expert
(i.e. the judge) to weigh the risks and to issue a decision as to what course of treatment
the patient should follow. This, they argue, presents an unacceptable risk to the health
of mentally-ill patients who are afforded little say over the medications that will enter
their bodies, and more importantly over the risks to their health that will ensue. 127 Fur-
ther, the imposition of mandatory treatment plans along with forced medication may
leave many mentally-ill individuals resentful and defiant. 28 This is particularly true of
those who find themselves subject to a petition under Kendra's Law despite minimal
mental health history and little indication of imminent danger posed to their community.
Coupled with concerns regarding the elimination of fundamental rights of the men-
tally ill are those regarding the lack of independent expert medical evidence required at
a hearing under Kendra's Law. Under the current structure of Kendra's Law, the treat-
ing physician is responsible for presenting his professional opinion regarding mental
illness, as well as for presenting all of the medical evidence in support of the patient's
outpatient commitment. Those who oppose this structure argue that the subject of a
petition under Kendra's Law should be able to present independent expert evidence in
support of their mental health. 29 Further, this dual role for the examining physician
could result in a conflict of interest or perhaps merely excessive discretion, leading to a
compromised evaluation of the best interests of the mentally-ill individual.
Finally, questions of funding and liability surface. 30 The statutory scheme under
Kendra's Law requires extensive physician diagnosis, research, and treatment but does
not disclose the source of its funding. If the bulk of the funds will come from state
sources, the heavy burden required by the statute should be reviewed and approved by
the citizens of New York first. Additionally, questions of liability will become signifi-
cant should the program result in unfounded treatment or commitments. 13 ' Again, who
will be liable under this scheme and should citizens who oppose the law in the first place
125. See id. at 2437 (noting that opponents of Kendra's Law challenge whether the statute is actually the
"least-restrictive alternative").
126. See id. at 2435 (explaining that "New York courts have found that 'forcible medication can alter
mental processes and limit physical movement, and therefore is analogous to bodily restraint.' Bodily inva-
sions, such as involuntary medication, implicate due process rights, which require some governmental justifi-
cation").
127. See O'Connor, supra note 4, at 343.
128. See Bruce Winnick et al., Exposing The Myths Surrounding Preventive Outpatient Commitment for
Individuals with Chronic Mental Illness, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y. & L. 209, 229-30 (2003) (responding to
findings in a longitudinal study of coercion in mental hospital admissions performed by the John D. and Cath-
erine T. MacArthur Foundation, finding that procedural justice was one of the most significant factors to
eliminate feelings of anger and helplessness among mental patients) [hereinafter Winnick, Exposing the
Myths].
129. See VA CODE. ANN. § 37.1-67.3 (Michie 1976) (providing the mentally-ill individual who is subject to
an outpatient commitment order an opportunity to present her own medical history and expert testimony in her
defense).




then be responsible for making amends to victims of the law? The answers to these
questions so far have been unavailing.
B. Arguments In Support of Assisted Outpatient Treatment Laws
1. Kendra's Law Protects Both The Community and The Mentally Ill
The primary foundation for those who support AOT laws such as Kendra's Law is a
concern for the threat to safety posed by mentally-ill individuals who sometimes terror-
ize the communities in which they live. 132 Unlike the fear associated with stereotypical
inner-city criminals, citizens of communities threatened by the mentally ill feel empow-
ered by AOT laws that allow residents to identify and target future offenders before they
have the chance to harm their communities and neighbors. 133 Thus, AOT laws provide
the rest of the community with a stronger sense of security, ostensibly pursuant to the
state's police power duty to safeguard the security and wellbeing of its citizens.
The sense of empowerment to fight crime is coupled with a concern to help those
who do not know, or prefer not to recognize, that they are mentally ill and in need of
medical treatment. In addition to providing needed medical treatment, AOT laws also
help depress historical readmission rates for those mentally ill individuals who seem to
float in and out of treatment in perpetuity. 135 The power to impose treatment upon the
mentally ill also could potentially save the state significant funds as the unending cycle
of treatment and decompensation will, at least theoretically, come to an end under
Kendra's Law.
136
2. Kendra's Law Provides the Least-Restrictive Means Available
Those who support AOT laws also argue that the structure of Kendra's Law is con-
sistent with the least restrictive means principle.137 They point to the fact that it allows
for safe rehabilitation and minimizes a "crisis approach" by relying on medical expertise
132. Gutterman, supra note 53, at 2432.
133. See Bruce Winnick et al., Involuntary Outpatient Commitment, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 94, 98
(2003). [hereinafter Winnick, Involuntary Outpatient Commitment]. "With the psychiatric patient... we may
eventually require hospitalization [of the patient] because the patient becomes dangerous. So we, the commu-
nity, have an interest in making sure the patient does not devolve into needing involuntary inpatient treatment.
.. If the psychiatric patient needs involuntary inpatient treatment it generally means that he has become a
danger; and that is putting ourselves at risk."
134. But see Winnick, Exposing the Myths, supra note 128, at 218-19. Winnick argues that current AOT
laws are not strict enough and that "chronically mentally ill individuals who do not presently pose a danger
due to their compliance with medication are not subject to a commitment order in these jurisdictions [with
AOT laws]. This requirement of imminent dangerousness which the petitioner often must demonstrate by
proffering evidence of a recent overt act, risks releasing potentially dangerous, mentally disordered individuals
into the community without appropriate monitoring of their mental health." Id.
135. Id. at 228 (citing the results of studies showing that "sustained outpatient commitment, when com-
bined with a high intensity of outpatient services, reduced hospital readmissions and helped prevent re-
hospitalization").
136. But see Use or Lose Kendra's Law, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 7, 2000, at 32 (reporting that while
officials had initially projected that Kendra's Law would cover up to 7,000 mental patients in the state of New
York, as of four months after the passage of Kendra's Law in November 1999, only nine mental patients had
been committed pursuant to its assisted outpatient treatment plan).
137. See Winnick, Exposing the Myths, supra note 128, at 218-19 (discussing different state approaches to
the least restrictive alternative principle and advocating a heightened standard for outpatients, similar to the
standard used to assess the rights of inpatients, particularly in light of recent incidents of violence by mentally-
ill persons who live in the community under low-restriction treatment plans).
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to fashion a treatment plan that requires the least amount of restriction possible while
narrowly addressing the affected individual's mental illness.' 38 This, supporters argue,
is a sufficient safeguard. It ensures that involuntary medication will only be introduced
if the patient refuses to comply with the approved treatment plan-and responds to a
clear need for additional treatment to protect the community. 1
39
Further, Kendra's Law allows the mentally-ill individual to participate in the forma-
tion of the plan, even allowing significant others in his or her life to provide input into
the plan's formation. Finally, AOT plans are the least-restrictive alternative because
they avoid treatment through institutionalization; they allow the mentally-ill individual
to retain his or her physical liberty while simultaneously protecting the community from
uncontrolled behavior. Certainly, the argument goes, a mentally-ill patient will be more
likely to comply with a treatment plan that preserves some modicum of physical free-
dom and in which the patient him or herself participated in the planning.
3. Kendra's Law Provides Sufficient Procedural Safeguards
Proponents of Kendra's Law point to several structural components of the law itself
to highlight safeguards that were built in to the law. As a threshold matter, many argue
that the requirement of a history of violence or threats, most often documented due to
hospital stays, is a sufficient safeguard against the potential unreliability of a physician's
diagnosis.' 4° The argument is based on the idea that if the patient has demonstrated a
documented history of violence, the basis for the physician's recommendation for AOT
is bolstered, and the danger to the community is further proved.
14 1
As a procedural matter, during the initial evaluation phase the evaluating psychia-
trist or physician is required to detail his or her recommendations for medication, ex-
plaining both the benefits and the potential side effects and risks of the recommended
medication for approval by the court. 42 This safeguard was designed to act as a control
on the recommending physician and to provide a balancing assessment to protect the
mentally-ill individual from excessively risky medication treatment plans.
Kendra's Law supporters also point to the fact that the statute only provides for con-
finement if the patient fails to adhere to the treatment plan and the patient's physician
finds him or her to be in need of involuntary admission to an institution. The law pro-
vides no other enforcement mechanism for those who fail to comply with their court-
ordered treatment and is replete with protections for the mentally-ill individual through-
out the evaluation process. While a non-compliant AOT patient may be held involuntar-
ily for up to seventy-two hours for evaluation by a physician, if at any time the physi-
cian determines that the patient does not qualify for admission, the patient must be re-
138. See also Winnick, Exposing the Myths, supra note 128, at 225 (arguing that the requirement of an
adversarial proceeding in outpatient treatment laws such as Kendra's Law, including the right to secure coun-
sel and provide evidence of mental competence, is sufficient to guarantee the due process rights of the men-
tally ill).
139. See In re K.L., 2004 WL 303202 at *4.
140. Id.
141. See Winnick, Exposing the Myths, supra note 128, at 222 (arguing that AOT laws require "proof of
more than some free-floating tendency toward aggression; the petitioner must present evidence of mental
illness coupled with prior inpatient hospitalization or violent behavior linked to medication noncompliance
such that, without court-ordered treatment, the individual will 'predictably' become dangerous").
142. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.600)(1)-(2) (McKinney 1999).
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leased immediately. 143 Further, the physician must provide a supportable evaluation and
prove that the patient qualifies for institutionalization which requires a finding of in-
competence in order to meet the Rivers standard for inpatient treatment. Thus, the AOT
order issued under Kendra's Law itself cannot be the grounds for inpatient treatment,
and consequently does not constitute an impermissible restriction of liberty.
Finally, supporters of Kendra's Law point to the provision for the mentally-ill indi-
vidual's right to counsel and the guarantee of a hearing before the court as safeguards
against arbitrary medical treatment and medical provider discretion. 144 The statute re-
quires significant documentation and the presentation of extensive evidence by the treat-
ing psychiatrist or physician. These requirements, coupled with the detached review of
a state judge and the provision for an advocate to exclusively represent the mentally-ill
individual, combine to provide sufficient protection for the interests of mentally-ill citi-
zens while protecting the community in which they reside.
145
VI. CONCLUSION
The New York legislature enacted Kendra's Law following a series of tragic events,
and the law was designed to address the threats to community safety posed by mentally-
ill citizens. Kendra's Law, however, overshoots its mark and consequently creates a
scheme for outpatient treatment that impermissibly intrudes on the privacy and liberty
rights of the mentally ill. Much of Kendra's Law does withstand constitutional scru-
tiny-perhaps even those provisions that confer open-ended authority and discretion on
medical personnel to issue evaluations, treatment plans, and non-compliance review.
Where Kendra's Law runs afoul of the constitution is in its omission of a requirement
that mental patients subject to AOT orders first be declared mentally incompetent.1
46
The omission of an incompetence finding prior to the issuance of an AOT order is sig-
nificant not so much for the threat it poses to compliant mental patients, but rather to
those who fail to adhere to their prescribed treatment regimen, and thus risk conversion
of their treatment under outpatient status to that of permanent inpatient. 1
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While there are compelling arguments in support of Kendra's Law, its failure to
provide for an incompetency determination is its primary flaw. Although Kendra's Law
does provide substantial procedural safeguards and, at least textually, requires a finding
that the proposed treatment be the least restrictive alternative, New York's grant of au-
thority to treat those suffering from a mental illness without a formal finding of mental
incompetence, or even a diagnosis of mental illness, renders the statute as a whole
143. Id. § 9.60(n). The standards necessary to qualify for admission as an inpatient necessarily include a
finding of mental incompetence. See also Rivers, 67 N.Y. 2d 485, 494 (1986).
144. See Perlin, supra note 113, at 206. See also Winnick, supra note 128, at 225.
145. See Perlin, supra note 113, at 206.
146. This Note does recognize that the weight of authority in New York is to the contrary, having resolved
all similar constitutional challenges in favor of the state's protective interest. Nevertheless, the omission of an
incompetence requirement under Kendra's Law renders the statute significantly more restrictive than its coun-
terpart in most states and unnecessarily infringes on the rights of the mentally ill to be free from forcible
medication and involuntary confinement.
147. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(n) (McKinney 1999) (providing for a seventy-two hour detention
period during which the noncompliant patient's physician may "determine whether such person has a mental
illness and is in need of involuntary care and treatment in a hospital"). The statute does not define what con-
stitutes noncompliance. Therefore, noncompliance could conceivably lead to the involuntary inpatient con-




overly intrusive. New York would do well to look to the statutory language contained in
Alabama and Hawaii's outpatient treatment statutes. Both states require a formal adju-
dication of mental incompetence prior to authorizing the involuntary treatment and
medication of mental patients. 148 By requiring a formal incompetence determination,
those states ensure that in cases of involuntary treatment, the state has legitimate parens
patriae authority to act in the best interests of both the mental patient-through the pro-
vision of needed mental health assistance-and the community in which he or she
lives-in the form of protection against violent or threatening decompensated mental
patients.
In the alternative, New York should at least adopt a requirement that the court de-
termine that the subject of an involuntary outpatient treatment order is "mentally ill" as
codified under the Virginia and Wyoming statutes. 149 While Kendra's Law currently
requires that the patient be "suffering from a mental illness,"'1 50 this standard is not the
same as a formal diagnosis that the patient is mentally ill.1 5 ' The distinction between
"suffering from mental illness" and "mentally ill" is clear through the plain text of the
statute. The provisions governing the failure to comply with AOT orders explicitly
provide for the involuntary inpatient commitment of a noncompliant patient on the basis
that the patient is "mentally ill." This necessarily means, then, that under Kendra's Law,
a patient who is diagnosed as mentally ill is in need of greater medical treatment or inpa-
tient commitment than one who is merely "suffering from a mental illness." Thus, a
patient who started out as merely "suffering from a mental illness" can be involuntarily
institutionalized on the basis of an analysis by the same physician who first placed him
or her under the AOT and without further judicial review. Therefore, although Kendra's
Law seems to mirror many of the substantive provisions of other states' assisted outpa-
tient treatment laws, the depressed standard for mental-illness assessment renders the
New York statute impermissibly intrusive and denies mental patients in New York their
right to freedom from invasive and involuntary medical treatment.
As it stands today, Kendra's Law constitutes an unacceptable burden on the rights
of the mentally ill and poses a serious threat to the future treatment of New York's men-
tal patient population. The New York legislature must amend Kendra's Law to include
a provision for a judicial determination of mental incompetence, or at the very least a
formal diagnosis of mental illness, before it can claim constitutional integrity.
148. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 334-121 (Michie 1984); ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.2 (1991) (both requir-
ing that the court enter a formal adjudication of mental incompetence before the state can compel the subject
of a petition to submit to involuntary outpatient treatment).
149. See VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.3 (Michie 1976); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 25-10-110 (Michie 1977).
150. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(c)(2) (McKinney 1999).
151. See id. § 9.60(n).
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